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Organic Intellectuals: Legitimizing Agribusiness Production 
in Brazil 
 




In the period under study (2003-2010), environmentalist and 
agribusiness representatives were in mutual opposition regarding 
the enforcement of the Forest Code: from the agribusiness point of 
view, application of this legal norm would possibly see a reduction 
of the productive area in the Mato Grosso (MT) state; from the 
environmentalists’ point of view, enforcement of the law was the 
only one way to control deforestation, hence the necessity to 
monitor this enforcement. 
The Mato Grosso state, in the Midwest region of Brazil, greatly 
expanded its Gross Domestic Product in the decade 1990-2000, 
based mainly on a horizontal growth of its areas of agricultural 
production. To put this growth in perspective, from 1992 to 2007, 
the state of Mato Grosso doubled the amount of deforestation as 
compared with what had happened up to 1992 (an increase of 
105%), representing approximately an additional deforestation of 
18 million hectares (180 thousand km2), an area corresponding to 
almost one and a half times that of England (Azevedo, 2009). 
According to the Mato Grosso Environment Minister, from 2003 
to 2007 almost 7 million hectares were deforested. Moreover, in 
2002, the state elected as governor Blairo Borges Maggi, popularly 
regarded as “the King of Soy”, one of the largest producers of this 
commodity in the world, “the hardest working man in the Brazilian 
soy business” according to Forbes Magazine, and a man who in 
2014 joined the ranks of the world’s billionaires. 
Nevertheless, it was under this governor that the Mato Grosso 
state consolidated a supposed green policy. In 2000, Mato Grosso 
began implementing a monitoring system, with seemingly ideal 
technological support, to enforce the Brazilian Forest Code. This 
had been stipulated by a 1965 law governing environmental 
conservation in private areas in Brazil, and remained in force until 
its substitution in 2012 by subsequent legislation. This legal code, 
known as SLAPR (Sistema de Licenciamento Ambiental para 




Propriedades Rurais” or “System for Environmental Licensing of 
Rural Properties”), in its conceptual design contained the 
integration of licensing (information), monitoring (satellite images) 
and an inspection conducted from the monitoring step 
(enforcement). The system reached its full development in 2003, 
and farmers entering the system had their deforestation areas 
monitored by satellite images, in order to obtain a certificate of  
legal conformity that their deforestation areas was maintaining the 
reservation areas determined by law. The certification itself is 
obtained through the Mato Grosso Legal Program, created by the 
governor in 2008. 
Bieler and Morton (2003, p. 1) recommend trying to “find out, 
through an empirical analysis, which social forces attempt to 
formulate a hegemonic project around which ideas” and 
investigating how the “forces of capital become internalized in a 
particular form of state or how they are resisted”. Our study is 
based on an empirical case investigation of the production structure 
and, in attempting to characterize the social forces who are the key 
collective actors, thus fits well into Bieler and Morton’s framework 
and the methodological challenges that these authors address. We 
bring into play Gramsci’s concept of organic intellectual in order to 
seek theoretical support to explain the paradox of the Mato Grosso 
state and understand the role played by state governor Maggi (2003-
2010) in the process, as well as the strategy employed by him at that 
moment in time, which resulted in the change of the Brazilian 
Forest Code. Thus the argument we adduce here is that, despite the 
declared profile of the Mato Grosso state governor as a politician 
putting forward reformist environmentalist proposals, he should be 
regarded as an organic intellectual of the agribusiness sector, 
dedicated to the maintenance of the hegemony of that group. 
 
 
2. The reaction of agribusiness to environmental criticism: the System for 
Environmental Licensing of Rural Properties enters the scene  
In 1999/2000 the first public policy instrument was produced, 
and proclaimed to be being capable of licensing and monitoring 
and, thus, effectively overseeing the implementation of the Forest 
Code in the Amazon. The rationale for the policy makers was based 
on assumptions that the data on deforestation in the Mato Grosso 




state could only be truly known if there was reliable information, 
and that this information, if used correctly, could generate control 
and ensure the implementation of the Forest Code. This, then, was 
the logic lying behind the new system, and the big news was that 
this would be done using remote sensing technology combined 
with a Geographic Information System (GIS), providing licensing 
which would be able to identify individually each farm where there 
is agricultural activity. This identification of property, including the 
demarcation of the Legal Reserve and Permanent Preservation 
Areas, would be a key instrument to facilitate the monitoring of 
deforestation, defining them as legal or illegal activities, and to 
name the possible offenders. 
The political-economic justification for the implementation of 
instruments of control (SLAPR being an example of this) relies 
exactly on this possibility of distinguishing between legal and illegal 
deforestation. By this differentiation, it would be possible to 
respond to society and to international public opinion, which are 
demanding that the State should adopt a clear position in face of 
the increasing deforestation. This would legalize at least part of the 
agriculture activities within the Mato Grosso state, since rural 
property could be licensed. The legalization would legitimize this 
form of production through alleged control by the State.  
The technical secretary in the Federal Subprogram of Natural 
Resources of the Ministry of the Environment was interviewed 
regarding the implementation of SLAPR in the Mato Grosso state 
and explicitly defined the commercial and economic role SLAPR 
could have. The original idea, he stated, was that the use of 
technology involved in the system would make it possible to verify, 
in the near future, the environmental situation of a licensed 
property on any computer on the planet and so it would be possible 
to develop a certified market for products of the Mato Grosso state 
(Azevedo, 2009).  
In fact, legalization of deforestation occurred within the system. 
Within licensed rural properties, comparing the 1995-1999 period 
(before implementation of the system) with the 2000-2007 period 
(after its implementation), there was an increase in deforestation of 
about 32%. The control sample, with rural properties outside the 
system, indicates that deforestation increased by only 1% from the 
first to the second period. However, in the second period (after 




implementation), only the SLAPR sample was legal. This means 
that the implementation of SLAPR, instead of reducing 
deforestation, allowed its expansion, ensuring however a State-
sanctioned status of legal deforestation. Except for some 
deforestation within the Legal Reserve (about 2.6% of the licensed 
area until 2006), all deforestation had a formal permission from the 
State (Azevedo 2009). In this institutional setting, the policy has 
enhanced a synergy between economic and the ecological logics 
(Rajão and Hayes 2009), with the numbers creating an illusion that 
Mato Grosso state was on the way to ending illegal logging. 
 
 
3. The legitimacy of capitalism and hegemony over environmental concern 
To understand the apparent paradox between economic status 
and the implementation of environmental policies, it is important to 
refer to a theoretical support to explain the changes that capitalism 
has assimilated after the emergence of environmental concern. 
The Mato Grosso state has entered the list of environmentalist 
criticisms as a major world grain producer, achieved at the expense 
of losing a large portion of natural areas, including those with high 
environmental fragility (i.e. large areas of the headwaters of the 
Amazon basin and the Pantanal). Boltanski and Chiapello (2002) 
argue that the criticism of capitalism undermines the pillars for its 
justifications. But, for the end of capitalism, this interpretation is 
too simple and deterministic. 
During the increasing occupation of the Amazon over the last 50 
years, several institutional logics have set the tone for 
environmental policies and the technologies used in these policies. 
These logics have formed over time and sometimes work in 
synergy, and sometimes in conflict, and are often present 
simultaneously: such is the case of ecological and economic logics 
(Rajão and Hayes 2009). This complex context reveals an apparent 
contradictory behavior especially in those stakeholders more bound 
to an economic logic, since, while they fear and condemn the 
increasing appreciation of the ecological discourse, they are also 
simultaneously becoming aware that they must somehow seek 
engagement in this discourse; at the same time, however, their 
practices do not represent full adherence to the green agenda. This 
may be interpreted as a parallel to Gramsci’s analysis of any system 




of crystallized ideas when faced with current practical needs: a 
“struggle between conservation and revolution, etc., between what 
was thought in the past and the new thinking; between the old that 
refuses to die and the new that wants to live, etc.” (Q6, § 139, 
Gramsci 1975, p. 311; Gramsci 2007, p. 110). 
It is important to say that the resulting processes may be only an 
adaptive simulacrum of the expected changes, and do not imply a 
real greening revolution. Capitalism has appropriated the non-
conflictive concept of Sustainable Development and also 
introduced it in the market system through various policies that 
have sought to overcome the conflicting sides in the dialectic of 
development: the environment and economic growth. (Leff 2006; 
Martinez-Alier and Jusmet 2001). Thus, a reformist market came to 
be established in order to meet worldwide environmental criticism 
after the 1980s. National environmental laws started to be 
demanded as a guarantee for international credits and access to 
foreign markets. In addition to national laws, the market begins to 
reward those business groups that did more than legally required or 
in some way proved that their so-called best practices constituted “the 
green seal” (Leff 2006).  
In this way, from nature now converted into natural capital, 
capitalism has dictated a new geopolitics, drawing a new topological 
design of the international division of labor. Northern countries, 
with an intensive production of knowledge in industrial and 
agricultural sectors, are “colonizing” practices in the South, 
especially as regards multinationals selling ready-made technology 
packages. Thus, countries in the South are being increasingly seen 
as exporters of natural capital (Azevedo et al. 2007).  
The Mato Grosso state is an emblematic case of the new 
international division of labor after the globalization of world 
markets. This state has specialized in the production of agricultural 
commodities with a high environmental cost in terms of loss of 
biodiversity and erosion of various other natural resources such as 
soil, water (by deforestation practice and the establishment of an 
industrial agriculture), and the consequent contribution of these 
practices to global warming (Nepstad 2006; Santilli et al. 2005; 
Fearnside 2005).  
This process of a great increase in agricultural production, seen 
particularly since 1998, has been not only a process spurred on by 




local forces and the entrepreneurship of migrants. All the 
infrastructure provided by public and private investments, such as 
the location of large buyers of grain crushers, funding for storage 
structures, and the logistics for transportation, have been important 
vectors as part of this dynamic (Becker 2007). Furthermore, this 
process has a direct interface with international demands as regards 
specialized commodities producers (Nepstad 2005), the regional 
history of land owning and land concentration, and also national 
government desires to gain more foreign currency by commodity 
exportation, thereby contributing to obtaining a balance of 
payments surplus (Rajão 2008). In short, the Mato Grosso state has 
assembled a number of conditions to play the desired role in the 
new international division of labor, including technological, 
economic, political and even ideological aspects.  
However, in the late 1990s, despite the stimulus of a globalized 
economy, the environmental critique had struck at the agribusiness 
sector very strongly, arguing against its consequences. The Mato 
Grosso state was pictured as one with very high rates of 
deforestation (as had occurred in 1995) and with alarming levels of 
burnings (as was seen in 1998). Something needed to be done so 
that these criticisms of the environmental aspect of production 
could be softened, and the agribusiness enterprises could be 
legitimized as environmentally responsible. This legitimation is part 
of the continued accumulation of capitalism in an exercise of 
hegemony “without force predominating excessively over consent”, 
as Gramsci explains (Q 13, §37, Gramsci 1975, p. 1638; 
summarized in Gramsci 1971, p. 80n; cf. also the first draft, Q 1, 
§48; Gramsci 1975, p. 59; Gramsci 1994, p. 156). The US scholar 
Michael Goldberg explains that hegemony “means the success of 
the dominant classes in presenting their definition of reality, their 
view of the world, in such a way that it is accepted by other classes 
as ‘common sense’. The general ‘consensus’ is that it is the only 
sensible way of seeing the world” (https://faculty.washington.edu/ 
mlg/courses/definitions/hegemony.html). In the words of another 
commentator, “Belief, faith, dogmatism may be understood as 
embryonic forms of hegemony, but a fully developed hegemony is a 
form of intellectual and moral leadership in which the mass of the 
population understands its own interests as being fundamentally 
compatible with the dominant social group” (Riley 2011, p. 12). 




Thus, legitimacy in this case represents the construction and 
maintenance of the hegemony of the agribusiness sector to dictate 
the way in which the land surface in the state is occupied and used, 
integrating urban and rural areas beyond the economic practice of 
agribusiness. This legitimacy also means the acceptance and rational 
justification of this land occupation and use by society in general, 
which means not only the agribusiness sector but also small 
producers, policy makers and even some environmentalists. It is 
opportune to remember that Gramsci believed that hegemony was 
ultimately rooted in economic power, as one of the expressions of 
class struggle through a combination of force and consent (Brosio 
1994, p. 50). Gramsci in fact noted that “for though hegemony is 
ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based 
on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the 
decisive nucleus of the economy” (Q 13, §18, Gramsci 1975; p. 
1591; Gramsci, 1971, p. 161). 
Hall (1996, p. 417) follows this reasoning, and while arguing that 
once hegemony is not exclusively an ideological phenomenon but 
must have a base in “the decisive nucleus of the economy”, 
combats a mechanistic viewpoint that tends “to see all other 
dimensions of the social formation as simply mirroring ‘the 
economic’ […], as having no other determining or structuring force 
in their own right”. Buckel and Fischer-Lescano (2009) also 
reinforce this idea. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is related to his 
view of power as a social construction related to economic, 
political, moral, intellectual, cultural and ideological questions and 
also articulated to the concept of the historical bloc and their 
agents. The historical bloc is seen as a result of the structure and 
superstructure in which “the complex, contradictory and discordant 
ensemble of the superstructure is the reflection of the ensemble of 
the social relations of production” (Q 8,  §182; Gramsci 1975, p. 
1051; Gramsci 1971, p. 366), creating an organic cohesion between 
intellectuals and people-nation (Q 11, §67; Gramsci 1975, p. 1505-
6; Gramsci 1971, p. 418) responsible for promoting a political 
initiative able to “liberate the economic thrust from the dead weight 
of traditional policies” (Q 13, §23; Gramsci 1975, p. 1612; Gramsci 
1971, p. 168).  The question hinges around how this organic 
cohesion can be created, and who the agent of this process may be, 
i.e. whether it can be forged by representatives of the economic 




hegemonic group or class. That is why Smith (2010) argues in favor 
of proximity of the hegemony concept to the leadership notion 
rather than the dominance one. 
Therefore, in addition to these macro-structural aspects, there is 
a need to analyze the role played by specific social agents, which 
may be decisive for a possible strengthening of the tendency of a 
line of discourse and public policies, which are able both to spread 
illusions and build new hegemonies in the public sphere.  
Fischman and McLaren (2005) remind us that the features of 
consent and coercion that underlie Gramsci’s model of hegemonic 
domination are dynamic categories, both forming part of the 
process to achieve supremacy:  
 
A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, 
or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. 
A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” before 
winning governmental power (…); it subsequently becomes dominant when it 
exercise power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 
‘lead’ as well (Q 19, §24; Gramsci 1975, p. 2010; Gramsci 1971, pp. 57-58).  
 
Because of this leadership component, which means that 
“hegemonic relationships not only play an ethical role but also a 
pedagogical one” (Fischman and McLaren, 2005, p. 3), when we 
integrate this pedagogical role with economic interest, we need to 
recognize that “hegemony requires the transcendence of narrow 
factional interests. Economic interests reflect into ideological 
consciousness” (Gündogan 2008, p. 52). That is why a profound 
look into the supposed agribusiness greening of the Mato Grosso 
state is important, as a first step to admitting the possibility of re-
articulation into an alternative hegemonic practice. Or, in the 
present case study, it can describe its reinforcing practice. 
How then is it possible to create an illusion that agribusiness in 
the Mato Grosso state could be on the path of conversion to an 
environmentally friendly practice? How could the state government, 
headed by the largest producer of soybeans (thus the expression of 
the presence of agribusiness at the helm of regional political 
power), be recognized as an environmentally-friendly government 
without creating an internal conflict around the person of the 
governor and his productive roots? What role could he (governor 
Maggi) have to serve the interests of the economic sector he still 




represents? These are the central questions to be posed to this 
study. 
In this sense, it seems worthwhile examining the concept of 
organic intellectual in the light of that context.  
 
 
4. The concept of organic intellectual in hegemonic meanings  
In Gramsci (Q 12, §1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1513; Gramsci 1971, p. 5), we 
read that  
 
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an 
essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with 
itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity 
and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the 
social and political fields. The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself 
the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a 
new culture, of a new legal system etc. It should be noted that the entrepreneur 
himself represents a higher level of social elaboration, already characterised by 
a certain directive and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity: he must have a 
certain technical capacity not only in the limited sphere of his activity and 
initiative but in other spheres as well, at least in those which are closest to 
economic production. He must be an organiser of masses of men; he must be 
an organiser of the ‘confidence’ of investors in his business, of the customers 
for his product, etc. 
 
Thus, a first hypothesis is that governor Maggi could be 
embodying the role of Gramscian concept of an organic intellectual 
linked this time to agribusiness. However, several objections have 
been raised about this hypothesis.  
A first objection arose from non-Gramscian researchers, who 
demonstrated the attachment to the concept of traditional 
intellectual. In this context, an intellectual means someone whose 
intellectual status would be recognized by Academia as a result of 
accumulated titles and/or the activity of theoretical elaboration. 
These intellectuals always come from a group of experts of practical 
knowledge, such as lawyers, mathematicians, doctors, teachers, 
whose quantitative presence in a given society depends on its 
economic development and thus to the growing possibility of the 
social division of labor, as argued by Sartre in his A Plea for 
Intellectuals (Sartre 1994). Thus, based on the vision of Sartre’s 
classical intellectual, governor Maggi would be excluded from this 




group. However, this discourse was criticized by Gramsci, 
described by him as a methodological error in the distinction of 
intellectuals and their role in society.  
 
The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked 
for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, 
rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities 
(and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place 
within the general complex of social relations (Q12 §1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1516; 
Gramsci, 1971, p. 8).  
 
If we accept this argument of Gramsci’s, we could overcome this 
first objection, and look for the understanding of the intellectuals’ 
role and origin within social relations and their corresponding 
historical context. They are not pure in themselves, but are 
products of history, with their consequent commitment to their 
social class or group. The supposed neutrality of the intellectuals 
usually serves to reinforce the hegemony of the ruling class. 
Additionally, Gramsci says that all men are intellectual, and 
‘although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-
intellectuals’ (Q12 §3, p. 1550; Gramsci 1971, p. 9). Thus, we may 
conclude that there are different types or profiles of intellectuals, 
some of them politically engaged to forge an alternative hegemony, 
and others committed to the maintenance of the ruling class 
hegemony. For Gramsci, both groups include his category of 
organic intellectuals. 
We should now face a second category of objection to our 
central hypothesis: Do organic intellectuals necessarily mean left-
wing politically engaged intellectuals? We have had to face 
objections to our analysis based on the mistaken belief that the 
term organic intellectual would refers only to the intellectual that is 
bound and committed to the working class. 
Paolo Nosella (2005), a well-known researcher in Brazil who has 
focused on issues of “Work and Education” and the “History of 
Education”, and is one of the great contributors in the spread of 
the Antonio Gramsci’s ideas, stated that just such a view was quite 
common in the 1980s, when many people erroneously felt that all 
organic intellectuals would necessarily be progressive, left-wing 
militants. Challenging this, Lino Resende (2006), in an article 
representing part of his master’s degree dissertation in Social 




History, observes that Gramsci expands the concept of intellectual, 
giving a connotation of formulator to organic intellectual, who 
could either be of the hegemonic classes or of those who act in the 
context of the production of an alternative hegemony in favor of 
the subaltern groups and classes. According to the same author 
“organic, in short, is the intellectual who participates, who acts, 
who helps in the formulation of a new hegemony or engages in the 
maintenance of hegemony. On the one hand and the other, the 
organicity comes from commitment, from participation, from the 
formulation of ideas to help in political action, whether hegemonic 
or counter-hegemonic” (Resende 2006, p. 6), where “counter-
hegemonic” is to be understood as the action of the subaltern 
groups involved. 
In the passage quoted about the formation of the intellectuals 
Gramsci said that “the capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside 
himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, 
the organisers of a new culture” (Q12 §1, p. 1513; Gramsci 1971, p. 
5).   
When the general hypothesis of this work was put under debate 
at a round-table discussion among academics in 2009, part of the 
discussion hinged around just how “organic intellectuals” were to 
be understood, and here we saw the emergence of this second type 
of objection, as transcribed below:  
 
What disturbs him [about another critic in the discussion group] – and that 
is the tone of the thinker whom I support “in spirit” – is exactly to question 
why we should give more power to someone who is a usurper of power, who 
bitterly and perversely promotes social inequality and environmental injustice 
[said of governor Maggi]. For my ideological choice, I refuse to offer Blairo 
Maggi this profile [the status of organic intellectual of the agribusiness sector] 
because I want to preserve my Gramscian interpretation [of the organic 
intellectual – editorial note] as a revolutionary and essentially left-wing militant. 
And [I want to] continue to believe that the organic intellectual is one who 
fights in favor of the subaltern masses, the excluded, the marginalized, the 
shoeless and shirtless, and not just [a title that can be appended] to any specific 
group, whatever they are (discussant 1).  
 
As it stands this participant does not seem to take into account 
that organic intellectuals may belong to a non-subaltern class, such 
as those representing the agribusiness sector. It is important to 
remember that although this participant defines himself as a 




follower of Gramsci, he prefers give his own interpretation of 
Gramsci’s ideas than read carefully Gramsci words. As quoted 
above, in Gramsci’s view (Q 12 §1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1513; Gramsci 
1971, p. 5) every social group creates together with itself those 
intellectuals who are, because of that fact, considered organic ones. 
Another representative participant in the discussion also used the 
same argumentative logic, again denying the status of organic 
intellectual of the agribusiness sector to governor Maggi:  
 
However, the idea of the intellectual that I also passionately advocate for 
the popular sectors, as Gramsci also did, is that these sectors develop for 
themselves and others sufficient legitimacy of a [new] rationality, true or not, 
but developed so as to resist in sharp debate, which has connective threads 
allowing them to find points of reference, because [this rationality] will sustain 
a more or less coherent and consistent political position. In this sense, there is 
an idea of ‘ideology’, of a certain corpus, a certain consistency, that is 
independent of ‘the truth’. However I refuse to recognize that the opportunists 
whose theoretical framework is only that which provides accumulation, and 
whose support points are unassailable because they keep changing their 
underlying principles whenever the situation is convenient, and who live by the 
chance collection of capital gain, wherever they can find it, without ethical 
rules, who opportunistically change the legal and political apparatus, and many, 
many times, announce it in public and then undo it in private, I refuse to 
recognize that this killer cell [referring to Maggi] can be called a rational 
[human being] (discussant 2). 
 
The analysis of these words shows that these people in the 
discussion group did not want to allow Maggi the title of “organic 
intellectual” since they considered him the representative of the 
agribusiness sector, and thus, a conservative stakeholder. Since their 
objection is based on their belief that “organic intellectuals” should 
be left-wing, this recognition leads us to conjecture that the basis 
for their argumentation is more than just a methodological error, as 
foreseen by Gramsci: it also seems closer  to what Lenin (1940) had 
observed and criticized harshly as ultra-leftism. Lenin observed that 
“left-wing communism” corresponded to “an infantile disorder of 
Leftism” (1940, p. 24) or “left childishness” (1940, p. 26) which, in 
commenting on the debate regarding the participation of 
communist movements in parliamentary life, he also classified as a 
theoretical error. Can we conjecture that the refusal to see what 
Gramsci’s theory can offer us (just because of the possibility of 




applying the concept of organic intellectual to the governor they 
oppose) is a kind of ultraleftism and a theoretical error? 
From an academic point of view, before people makes personal 
and private interpretations of Gramsci influenced by their own 
ideology, it is first necessary that we return to the Gramsci’s original 
formulation of the organic intellectual. In this original theoretical 
framework, Gramsci just tries to get away from the traditional 
image of the intellectual to understand the dynamics and dialectics 
of social movements in the world and thus to rethink their 
practices. On many occasions it is possible to have in the 
progressive front those traditional intellectuals who adhere to a 
project of political transformation. But then there are those who are 
forged in the historical process, emerging from the factory floor, or 
from the social struggles of life (including those who were born in 
and remain linked to the agribusiness sector). These are organic 
intellectuals. Nevertheless, because of the privileged attention to 
those forged from social struggles, there is a misperception of 
recognizing as organic only those intellectuals committed to social 
change, as was commented on by Nosella (2005). The problem in 
the debate is whether we recognize this same process inside the 
dominant social class, and this will be discussed below. In 
particular, here we are talking about an agriculture sector, which is, 
in our times, strongly linked to processes of accumulation in the 
form of agribusiness.  
This sector includes individuals who have social origins distant 
from those situated among the traditional intellectuals, but they 
have a historical role in capital accumulation. The strategies and 
justifications in the light of globalized capitalism, and of a world in 
constant transformation, often require of this sector a highly 
dynamic behavior, sometimes having several intellectuals allied to 
their political project, while at other times their own members are 
required to think and act in favor of themselves. At the present 
time, one of the most important things for members of the 
agribusiness sector is how to cope with the increasing importance 
of environmental issues and how to find strategies for forwarding 
their interests of capital accumulation. These preoccupations should 
of course consider an evaluation of the correlation of forces, which 
may provide decisive elements to strategically opt for an open 
confrontation or a veiled face – a matter of hegemony. This can 




resemble the strategy of legitimation of neoliberalism, as 
demonstrated by Crocetti (2004).  
What Gramsci tried to draw attention to is precisely the fact that 
there is a movement of theoretical formulation that is seeking 
greater social cohesion and practical actions not only on the 
revolutionary side, but also on the side of those who desire the 
maintenance of the status quo (the ruling class), in different hues. He 
also addressed the question that, behind such movements, there is a 
quest for greater technical skills (instrumentation), where there is an 
obviously selectivity to serve their interests. We have to look at the 
whole historical process and the general class interests. 
Acknowledging this historical movement does not take away the 
character of our left-wing position and commitment to social 
justice. It only makes us more cautious regarding what is going on 
in terms of social struggles. 
One should not therefore rush to assign the term organic 
intellectual only to those committed to transformative ideas, either 
by denying governor Maggi the profile of organic intellectual, or by 
giving him another name as does Semeraro (2006) with the use of 
the term ‘functional intellectual’. It should be noted that, contrary 
to this trend, Ferreira Jr. and Bittar (2006) attributed to Jarbas 
Passarinho the status of organic intellectual in the service of the 
then military dictatorship in Brazil. Riley, basing himself on 
Gramsci’s Selections from Prison Notebooks, recalled that Moderates 
won against Party of Action because, in his view, ‘they were the 
organic intellectuals of the Piedmontese bourgeois aristocracy’ in 
the Italian Risorgimento of the XIX century (2011, p. 17). 
It is important to emphasize here that we are not discussing 
personal preferences. One may wish organic intellectuals always to 
be left-wing, but we need to understand that we are borrowing a 
theoretical framework from someone and we must take over its 
originality, preserving what was actually said, and not our own 
preference and interpretation. We are free to disagree with the 
thought of Gramsci, as others have done, but right now we are 
attempting to do him justice.  
This does not detract from the value or merits the opposition 
presented here by the excerpts quoted from members of the 
discussion group. We insist only that we must distinguish what are 




Gramsci’s ideas, based on his writings, and what we think 
individually about his ideas.  
Thus, regarding Gramsci’s ideas, we should address the fact that 
a ruling class relies not only on coercive power and authority but on 
consent deriving from hegemony – what Gramsci calls the 
“intellectual and moral leadership” exercised by the ruling class. 
And it is in this context of (continuously) building and 
consolidating hegemony, that he highlights the role and the concept 
of the organic intellectual.  
 
 
5. Maggi as an agribusiness organic intellectual 
Governor Maggi tried to announce the forestry policy of the 
Mato Grosso state as a great environmentalist achievement and, 
therefore, a major advance in line with ecological principles. With 
this enhanced status the new Mato Grosso policy came to join a list 
of environmentally friendly initiatives, without contradicting the 
class interests of the agribusiness sector, a move made possible 
because environmental liability was not solved, and costs for 
producers are still located in the future. During Maggi’s 
governorship there was an exhaustive attempt to ease legislation, so 
that, in the light of environmental protections laws, big farmers – 
linked to agribusiness – as much as medium farmers and small 
peasant farmers could adapt to this new context.  
Researchers from the Federal University of Minas Gerais 
Environmental Issues Research Group (GESTA / FAFICH / 
UFMG), basing themselves on studies on hydroelectric licensing in 
the Minas Gerais state found a result that can be compared to the 
case of the Mato Grosso state  (Zhouri et al. 2005). According to 
the group, laws and regulations are often ‘appropriated’ by 
capitalism so they are not an obstacle to private economic projects. 
In general, these enterprises obtain a connotation of ‘public 
interest’ in official discourse. The character of the organic 
intellectual can be seen in the Mato Grosso case because the 
governor was able to visualize the situation outlined and submit a 
practical action guided by (non-emancipatory) class interest, 
justified by an instrumental rhetoric, associated with technical 
interest (Habermas 1994). Thus, the governor utilized the illusion 
that technology alone is sufficient to obtain correct results, 




fetishizing technology as Saito (1995) warned. It is also important 
to note that many farmers were expressing opinions based on the 
perception at a local and individual scale that indicated some worry 
or dissatisfaction with the advancement of SLAPR, since they 
believed it could result in a penalty and the surrender of the 
agribusiness sector to environmental dictates. This, then, is a 
demonstration that these producers did not have the strategic 
vision that may be possessed by the organic intellectual, but only an 
immediate and dull vision of an anonymous member of the social 
class to which they belong. In this context, it was said by many 
agribusiness representatives that the governor had forgotten his 
origins as a member of the agribusiness sector and was working 
against their interests. These criticisms were made without realizing 
the advantage that the legalization of deforestation was giving to 
the agribusiness sector, legitimizing the occupation of territory and 
attracting the most rigorous and exigent markets to the illusion they 
had of the end of deforestation. But even this inconvenience and 
lack of perception of individual members of the agribusiness sector 
also constitute evidence of the nature of “organic intellectual” 
represented by Maggi. The organic nature of this type of intellectual 
lies precisely in its ability to gather and articulate class interests in a 
broad perspective. Organic intellectuals also can be misunderstood 
by some individual members of the class that they seek to 
represent, but in terms of the final result, they turn out to be 
successful because they are able to strengthen and defend class 
interests in the medium and long term on a broader scale. 
Moreover, by actively seeking to underline the success of SLAPR, 
Maggi is trying to establish in Brazilian society a new hegemonic 
conception that SLAPR should be copied, as an exemplary model, 
by all states within the country and once this status is achieved, very 
few would dare to question the successful outcome: SLAPR would 
become unassailable and iconic. There would therefore be 
confirmation of what Eagleton said of Gramsci’s contribution: 
 
It is with Gramsci that the crucial transition is effected from ideology as a 
“system of ideas” to ideology as lived, habitual, social practice – which must 
then presumably encompass the unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social 
experience as well as the working of formal institutions.  
 




In this way, Eagleton addressed the fact that ideology and 
hegemony are connected, “the concept of hegemony extends and 
enriches the notion of ideology”, considering “hegemony is never a 
once-and-for-all achievement, but has continually to be renewed, 
recreated, defended, and modified” (1991, p. 115). In concluding 
this chain of ideas, we recall that Gramsci’s analysis links ideology 
to the historical bloc: such analyses “reinforce the conception of 
historical bloc in which precisely material forces are the content 
and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form 
and content has purely didactic value” (Q 7, §21; Gramsci 1975, p. 
869; Gramsci 1971, p. 377; Gramsci 2007, p. 172). 
In the Mato Grosso state, as well as the figure of the ex-governor 
being closely linked to the agribusiness sector, a fact thus 
empowering his policies, there is also the ethos of the hero, which 
valorizes someone who challenges difficulties, explores the vast 
potential of the country and somehow becomes a solitary pioneer 
in his context (Ames and Keck 1997-1998, p. 29). However, this 
ethos makes one believe that it is possible to transfer a person’s 
private ability to achieve economic growth to the economy of the 
community or the whole State. In this case, it is a transposition of 
the trajectory of life to politics, when the “primacy of the private” 
becomes the power in the “primacy of the public” (Bobbio 1997). 
The combination of all these elements contribute to legitimize 
Maggi as an organic leader of his class and also as an intellectual 
who “makes” new proposals to sustain the hegemony of the 
agribusiness sector.  
An element that appears as essential to sustain hegemony is the 
propagation of an ideology that produces “spontaneous consent” 
(again using a phrase of Gramsci’s) for the ruling class. “Ideology 
provides hegemony with the possibility of remaining invisible, 
disseminated throughout the texture of social life” (Resende 2006, 
p. 14). In the case of the Mato Grosso state, the agribusiness sector, 
now led by its organic intellectuals, appears to be taking the stance 
publicly that it did wrong in the way it promoted land occupation, 
although it had reasons for so doing. So, it is showing apparent 
regret, and asking for a relaxation of the rules to agree to a new 
beginning, a renewed and sustainable one in view of a new socio-
environmental scenario (Layrargues 1998). 




Further, the economic rationale behind the form of land 
occupation is not clearly understood by society in general, including 
environmentalists. The high profitability generated in only a few 
years by agricultural commodities (soybeans and cotton), as 
happened in 2003 for example, is also absent from the agribusiness 
discourse. It is therefore clear that these justifications  are being 
used as a legitimizing ideology in favor of this form of production 
and occupation of the territory. Marilena Chauí, one of Latin 
America’s foremost philosophers and one of Brazil’s most 
renowned public and politically engaged intellectuals, outlines how 
this process occurs, explaining that 
 
The ideological production of social illusion aims to make all social classes 
accept the conditions in which they live, judging them as natural, normal, 
correct, fair, without attempting to transform them or really know it [social 
illusion], without taking into account the fact there is a profound contradiction 
between the actual conditions under which we live and ideas (Chauí, 1997, p. 
174). 
 
To accomplish this, effects are taken for causes: there is an 
inversion. For example, people used to say that ‘environmental 
degradation was caused because there was a need to grow food’ – 
and not because the landowners wanted to exploit more areas to get 
more profits’; or even ‘environmental degradation has occurred 
because farmers were not charged by the government agencies’ – 
and not because there was a convenience and connivance, through 
an informal institutional logic, such as a practice of corruption 
inside the environmental agencies. These are repertoires that are 
feeding ideology on agriculture in the Mato Grosso state, 
considered as being of ‘vital importance to the state, for Brazil and 
the world’. In this search for legitimacy, the environmental issue has 
become an arena of contention for the exercise of hegemony by 
agribusiness. 
This shifting scenario of conflicts, political achievements and 
setbacks around the environmental issue has a ‘backstage’ action 
which is often not clearly perceived: The agribusiness sector needs 
the state government for relaxation of the law. The state 
government, in turn, seeks the formulation of agreements and 
creation of consensus both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, it 
tries to establish commitments in favor of the agribusiness sector 




with other levels of the Brazilian government system (i.e. the upper 
Federal level and the lower municipal level). Horizontally, the state 
government tries to obtain the adherence of other regional 
stakeholders, such as industries, financers and environmental 
NGOs. Maggi acted in favor of the agribusiness sector, but tried to 
be seen as neutral. The agribusiness claim is considered one of the 
many external pressures to which the state government needs to 
respond. An article on Maggi’s attendance at the 13th Conference 
of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change portrays this new position: an awakened vocation to 
green issues: 
 
The governor of the Mato Grosso state and soybean king, Blairo Borges 
Maggi, came to Bali to outline his newly awakened vocation to the green (and 
not green) soy plants. He sat next to Marina Silva, his former archrival, and 
signed an agreement yesterday with the Nature Conservancy NGO to raise 
US$ 15 million and put all the farms in his state into the SLAPR, the system 
for licensing rural properties which allows the mapping of illegal deforestation 
by satellite (Angelo 2007). 
 
This process of consultation and agreements between these 
seemingly opposing sides allowed the governor to consolidate his 
position, i.e. put himself forward as a legitimate representative in 
seeking solutions for the productive class, externally as regards non-
local spheres (such as the Federal Government), and internally as 
the provider of environmental solutions for the state. Within this 
process of dialogue, the state government, and the figure of the 
governor in particular, used the discourse of ‘sustainable 
development’ as an ideology. Their hope, along with civil society 
organizations, was to build a new ‘agri-environmental’ image, as can 
be seen in a statement by Maggi during the Katoomba Meeting, 
held in Cuiabá-MT, in April 2009: “here in the Mato Grosso state, 
we are not in conflict with the environmental area, we are walking 
[together]”.  
Thus, it would appear that Maggi, as political representative of 
the regional state, but also as political representative of the 
agribusiness interests inside the state, is seeking to convince public 
opinion that he is forging consensus with other sectors of civil 
society.  




Accordingly, the above arguments support the hypothesis 
formulated in this paper that Maggi is fulfilling more the role of 
organic intellectual for the agribusiness class, once we insert him 
into contemporary economic production; he is preparing an ethico-
political concept, and enabling himself to pursue the organizational 
function of establishing social, political and economic hegemony. 
He is aware of his class representation and serves not only to build 
a consensus around the political project of his class, but also to 
ensure the legal and administrative functions necessary for it, as 
well as the maintenance of political power in society. He is aware of 
the type of production required by the global project of his class 
and has acted materially and culturally (working in the sphere of 
infrastructure and superstructure) for this purpose, mainly to 
strengthen the process of capital accumulation by agribusiness in a 
legitimated way when faced with environmental rhetoric. 
Moreover, Maggi is also connected to the most advanced sectors 
of the agribusiness social group, in the sense that these sectors 
possess a historical view with long-term strategies, aiming at 
strengthening their positions regarding social struggles. Many 
members of his own class, because they are more conservative and 
attached to traditional forms of struggle and accumulation, do not 
understand his strategy of expansion and the consolidation of 
hegemony. 
A new detail, to which it is worthwhile paying attention, should 
be noted in this scenario: after the initial analysis was done in 
accordance with the guidelines of this article, focusing primarily on 
the legitimacy of deforestation via SLAPR, ex-governor Maggi was 
subsequently elected as a new senator of the Republic from the 
Mato Grosso state. His arrival in the National Congress, just when 
a draft revision of the Brazilian Forest Code was formulated – the 
changes effectively eased a number of environmental protective 
rules – shows a multiple-fronted strategic action, in great synchrony 
with a broader national movement of the agribusiness sector. It is 
now clearer to see that these fronts include the removal of legal 
barriers, so as to legitimize the mode of land use by agribusiness, 
not to mention the change in legislation supported by the legislature 
in a representative democracy. This new scenario only reinforces 
the framework of analysis here presented, based on the Gramscian 
concept of the organic intellectual.  




All these events are in accordance with the arguments put 
forward by Mayo (2011) that the State regulates economic agencies 
by working in tandem with them, and although appearing to be 
neutral, it effectively engages in structured partnerships with 
industry (in this case, agribusiness) to secure the right basis for the 




The analysis of socioenvironmental conflicts, the apparent 
contradictions in State policies, and their implementations in the 
Mato Grosso state of Brazil, allow us to reflect more carefully on 
the paradox of a state that has records for deforestation and was 
governed by a significant representative of agribusiness, which is 
also at the same time implementing a modern and apparently 
efficient System for Environmental Licensing of Rural Properties 
(SLAPR) in order to control deforestation within the state. The key 
for understanding this paradox comes from the theoretical 
elaboration in Gramsci, mainly through his concept of the organic 
intellectual. The insight provided by this concept helps to reveal the 
hidden contradictions designed to curb the jingoism around SLAPR 
and allows us to carefully evaluate their potentialities and 
limitations. Despite some resistance from left-wing intellectuals in 
applying this concept to the proposed situation, we have here 
shown that such an unfounded resistance is caused by a misreading 
of the original concept of organic intellectual. Moreover, we argue 
that the Gramscian concept of organic intellectual is still valuable in 
its original form in present-day conditions and contributes to 
understanding complex situations involving policy makers and 
social processes, especially when these situations are marked by a 
contradiction that formal logic classifies as a paradox.  
This experience of Maggi’s mediation and leadership, even in the 
environmental arena, shows that the organic intellectual is not 
necessarily revolutionary, nor does s/he have to be left-wing: 
indeed, as Gramsci notes: the ‘political party, for all groups [...] is 
responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given 
group – the dominant one – and the traditional intellectuals’ (Q 12, 
§1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1522; Gramsci 1971, p. 15). Maggi is an 
organic intellectual of the agribusiness sector and, because of that, 




was able to achieve the position of governor through a political 
party, and then in addition, the position of senator of the Republic 
at a crucial moment of the struggles between environmentalist and 
agribusiness sectors around the law for the protection of native 
vegetation. Maggi – in his role as governor – acted as a formulator 
of the ethico-politico-cultural propositions of the agribusiness 
sector for the whole of society, making alliances with 
environmental groups that were former opponents in the public 
sphere. 
 At this point, let us refer back to the guiding questions posed in 
this work: how, in the Mato Grosso state, could the representatives 
of agribusiness create the illusion that this economic sector is on 
the way to conversion to an environmentally friendly practice? How 
could the state government, headed by the largest soybean 
producer, be recognized as a government that implements 
environmentally-friendly policies? How is it that this same state 
government, in contradiction to its new image, simultaneously 
honors and boosts the production of commodities and their way of 
land occupation by intense deforestation and opening new areas of 
planting? In this sense, the set of findings that was commented on 
as answers to these questions indicate that a way was conceived to 
legitimize the capitalist production of commodities in the state, 
headed by an organic intellectual representative of the productive 
sector, namely the agribusiness one. 
At the current time, all who seek a role in favor of sustainable 
practices in the private and the public spheres, guided by critical 
thinking, still have much to learn. More than that, intellectual 
vigilance is required to correctly perceive the movements of 
concealment, accommodation and coupling to an environmental 
discourse without the corresponding practical results. The Mato 
Grosso state is one example of these situations that require an 
open-minded posture, so to evaluate more carefully the potential of 
SLAPR and recognize the historical limits to which this system is 
conditioned. In this way, we can break the illusion and fetishization 
around technology on which this system is based, recognizing that a 
deforestation control system cannot, a priori, be considered 
successful only because it is being supported by remote sensing 
technology and GIS.  




Finally, this case study has been an attempt, based on Gramscian 
concepts applied to the present, to describe how agribusiness as a 
social force intends to formulate a hegemonic project around the 
idea of sustainability, and to investigate how these forces of capital 
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